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I. INTRODUCTION
Interference with custody is a malignant tort.  When it is accomplished 
by abducting the children, it breaks their connection to the custodial 
parent.1  When it is done by false allegations such as claims of abuse, it 
may not only remove the children but subject them to indignities such as 
* © 2020 David Crump.  A.B., Harvard College; J.D., University of Texas School 
of Law.  John B. Neibel Professor of Law, University of Houston. 
1.  See Joy M. Feinberg & Lori S. Loeb, Custody and Visitation Interference: 
Alternative Remedies, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 271, 271 (1994). 
 131





    
 









     













   
    
 
intrusive medical examinations.2  It is no great surprise, therefore, that the 
claim for interference with custody has been recognized at common law 
or made law by statute in many states.3 
But there are major differences in the way in which courts have
applied the laws that their jurisdictions have recognized.  In some states, 
the claim has been treated with the right touch: not so broadly as to inhibit 
informal dealings between cooperating parents and not so stingily that its
purpose is defeated.4  But in other states, the claim has been adjudicated too
narrowly.5  This Article is an effort to find the right balance.
Part II of the Article contrasts two cases as examples.  Both cases
concern the potential liabilities of coparties who help the offending parent to
deny custody to the other.  One, from New Jersey, shows a better approach, 
in which the court correctly considers the element of intent or knowledge and
properly reviews the evidence.6  The other, from Texas, exemplifies a
cramped approach to these issues.7 
Part III analyzes the difficulties that are hidden in the cases.  What level
of intent or knowledge should be required?8 Does the allegedly offending
spouse need to know the particulars of the visitation decree, for example, 
or is an awareness that the offending parent is encroaching upon the other’s 
time sufficient?9  These and other questions are raised and answered in 
the contexts of the two example cases. 
Part IV argues that the claim for interference with custody should be 
maintained as viable.  The temptation to interfere during custody and 
visitation disputes is strong.10  Illegal activity is often successful in immediately 
stopping visitation.11  The harm that it does is significant. It should be added 
that situations involving battered spouses who receive children present 
different issues, and those cases are outside the scope of this Article.12 
The final Part contains the author’s conclusions, which include recognition 
of judges’ natural instinct to avoid heavy-handed applications of interference 
with custody laws.  Parents with healthy cooperation tend to make and remake
informal exchanges of visitation times and other aspects of their court-
2. See infra Part IV. 
3. See Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 1, at 278 (discussing remedies for the tort). 
4. See, e.g., infra Section II.A (discussing decision in New Jersey). 
5. See, e.g., infra Section II.D (discussing decision in Texas). 
6. See infra Section II.A.
 7. See infra Section II.B.
 8. See infra Section III.B.
 9. See infra Section III.D. 
10. See infra Part IV. 
11. See Feinberg & Loeb, supra note 1, at 271. 
12. See generally Courtney Cross, Criminalizing Battered Mothers, 2018 UTAH L.
REV. 259 (discussing different issues raised by this situation).
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ordered schedules, and these kinds of casual agreements inevitably precipitate
occasional disagreements.  Situations like these should not trigger the
disproportionate response of liability under the law. But the courts should 
avoid a standard of knowledge or intent that is impractical to meet and
should consider the evidence before them as in other cases with similar 
issues.
II. THE INTERFERENCE TORT IN TWO JURISDICTIONS
A. New Jersey: State v. Froland
After divorce, both the ex-husband (Kindt) and the ex-wife (O’Connor) 
resided in New Jersey.13 Kindt remarried to Froland.14  A court decree
governed the parties’ possession of their children.15  In the year at issue, 
O’Connor had custody during the Christmas holidays but agreed to allow 
Kindt to have the children from December 27 through the morning of 
December 30.16  But when O’Connor called on December 29, she found that
Kindt’s telephone had been disconnected, and when she went by Kindt’s 
home, she discovered that it was deserted.17 
Police investigation ultimately revealed that Kindt had removed the 
children to North Carolina, along with Froland.18  Froland herself had 
withdrawn large sums of cash from her bank accounts and forwarded the 
couple’s mail.19 Kindt had bought a boat, using a pseudonym.20 Froland’s 
computer contained a “to-do list” that included cutting off the telephone 
and ceasing contact with relatives.21  She had sent instructions to Kindt’s
parents about their possessions in New Jersey and other matters.22  On 
December 29, Kindt and Froland, together with the children, took public 
transportation to North Carolina, after maneuvers that the court described as 
intended to “cover their trail.”23 
13.  State v. Froland, 936 A.2d 947, 948 (N.J. 2007). 
14. Id.














   
 
 


























New Jersey authorities issued arrest warrants for Kindt and Froland.24 
The Coast Guard, responding to a distress signal, found them on the boat 
with the children.25  Authorities arrested Kindt, Froland, and another person
with them.26  Froland was convicted of kidnapping the children.27 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed that conviction.28  It held, in
accordance with the applicable statute, that kidnapping did not apply to a 
person who removed children with the consent of a parent.29  Froland had
acted, of course, with the consent of Kindt.  But the crime of interference with 
custody existed in New Jersey, and the court held that Froland could be 
convicted under this statute.30  The statute provided:
A person, including a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian, is guilty of 
interference with custody if he: 
. . . Takes or detains a minor child with the purpose of concealing the minor
child and thereby depriving the child’s other parent of custody or parenting
31time with the minor child . . . . 
“Froland’s behavior,” the court said, “falls squarely within the strictures 
of the . . . statute.”32 Thus, both she and Kindt “were subject to prosecution
under the interference with custody statute.”33 
B. Texas: Bos v. Smith
Bos v. Smith featured an ugly, but unfortunately not uncommon, strategy
by Mother, Trisha Bos-Smith, to defeat visitation by Father, Craig Smith.34 
She coached her son, Mike, to make sexual abuse allegations against
Father.35  Later, as part of an agreement that spared her from imprisonment 
and ended her custody of the children, she admitted that the allegations 
were concocted.36  Father later filed suit against the children’s maternal 
Grandparents, Larry and Mary Bos, for assisting Mother’s interference 
37 with custody.
24. Id.
 25. Id. at 950. 
26. Id.
 27. Id.
 28. Id. at 948. 
29. Id.
 30. Id. at 953–54. 
31. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-4(a) (2019). 
32.  Froland, 936 A.2d at 953. 
33. Id. at 956. 
34.  556 S.W.3d 293, 296 (Tex. 2018). 
35. Id.
 36. Id.
 37. Id. at 296–97. 
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The trial court found that Grandparents had acted with knowledge of
their interference and awarded $10.5 million in damages for this and other 
torts.38  The court of appeals affirmed.39  The Texas Supreme Court reversed
and rendered judgment of nonliability on the stated ground that the evidence 
was insufficient.40 
Mother was, as the court put it, “stingy” in allowing visitation by Father.41 
Therefore, Father sought and obtained a court decree containing the “standard
possession order,”42 which actually is a statutory provision in the state 
Family Code, providing for visitation at certain hours on Tuesdays and 
Thursdays and specific weekends, as well as holiday schedules.43 Father 
spoke with Grandparents in several conversations to ask that they seek 
cooperation on Mother’s part,44 and these conversations undoubtedly
would have included information about the visitation schedule, which, after 
all, was part of the law.  Mother’s noncooperative behavior remained.45 
The evidence against Grandparents became more specific with an event
unrelated to the false allegations of abuse.  Father expressly notified the 
Grandparents that his visitation was to begin at a specific time.46  Mother
instead directed Grandparents to take the children to a birthday party, and 
when the Father arrived to pick them up, no one was there.47 Mother later 
explained that she had forgotten about the birthday party.48 
The next morning, Mother unexpectedly brought both boys to Father’s 
home.49  But she soon called Mike on the phone and then called 911 to
make the first of several false claims of abuse, saying that Mike had reported 
that Father’s legal assistant had touched Mike’s penis.50  Police descended,
together with the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS), 





 43. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.312(a) (West 2019). 
44.  Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 297–98. 
45. See id.




 50. Id. at 297–98. 
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which launched an investigation.51  A hospital examination of Mike showed
no signs of abuse.52  Grandparents took the children for several days.53 
Father, Mother, and Mike met with DFPS for a series of interviews.54 
Mother now maintained that she had misunderstood and it was Father who 
had abused Mike.55  DFPS suggested that it would place the boys in foster
care.56  To avoid this, DFPS agreed to allow Grandparents to monitor
Mother’s contact with the children.57  They lived with Mother but soon
found this arrangement too demanding.58 
Grandfather began pressuring DFPS for a resolution.59 At one point, 
Grandfather told DFPS that “(1) Mother was a “perfect” mother; (2) Father 
was a nut with poor parenting skills; and (3) Father used to abuse his 
daughters and would brainwash them.”60  “Several years later, Grandfather 
admitted that he had said these things in a desperate attempt to facilitate 
termination of the monitoring obligation and that Father was actually a 
‘stand up guy.’”61 
Mother began dating a psychologist named Bruno, associated with
DFPS, who assisted Mother in making false abuse allegations.62  The trial
court held Bruno liable for interference with custody, and he did not appeal.63 
The state supreme court sifted through this and other evidence to support 
its reversal.  The other evidence included: (1) Mother’s earlier false allegation 
against a past boyfriend, including similar wrongful statements, which 
Grandparents were keenly aware of, because Grandparents paid a sum of 
money to settle the matter;64 (2) Grandparents’ taking of the children on
other occasions in violation of Father’s visitation;65 (3) other statements
by Grandparents disparaging Father;66 (4) Grandfather was at his “wit’s
end” from the behavior;67 (5) Grandparents’ continuous communication
with Mother;68 (6) Grandparents’ “monitoring” of Mother while residing












 63. Id. at 299. 
64.  Id. at 302, 304. 
65. See id. at 302. 
66. See id. at 298, 305. 
67. Id. at 298. 
68. See id. at 302. 
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with her for six weeks;69 and (7) psychiatric diagnoses of Mother as suffering 
from serious mental illnesses, which, although announced after the events, 
was indicative of behavior during the events.70  The court set out the standard
for insufficiency of evidence: 
Evidence is legally insufficient to support a disputed fact finding when (1)
evidence of a vital fact is absent, (2) rules of law or evidence bar us from giving
weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence
offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence
conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact.  We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the fact finding, indulging every reasonable inference 
that would support it and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable 
factfinder could not.71 
These standards are related to the established rule that the court views the 
evidence as a whole, not as individual pieces unrelated to other pieces.72 
But unfortunately, the Texas court dealt with every piece separately, explaining 
it away as though each item of evidence were isolated from the others.73 
III. HOW SHOULD A COURT CONSIDER A CLAIM OF
INTERFERENCE WITH CUSTODY? 
A. Adjudication, Not Conciliation 
A divorce judge generally looks for reconciliation of the parties and 
restoration of amicable relations.74  This instinct usually is healthy, because
everyone is better off with cooperation, and the law is built around the 
best interest of the children.75  But in a case in which there is a claim of 
interference with custody, the statute or common law does not depend 
upon anyone’s welfare.  Instead, it calls for adjudication.76 
69. Id. at 298. 
70. See id. at 304. 
71. Id. at 299–300 (footnotes omitted). 
72. See, e.g., Jewish Hosp. & St. Mary’s Healthcare, Inc. v. House, 563 S.W.3d
626, 630 (Ky. 2018) (reviewing “evidence as a whole”); Maria A. ex rel. Leslie G. v. Oscar 
G., 919 N.W.2d 841, 852 (Neb. 2018) (same). 
73. See generally Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 300–08 (analyzing evidence). 
74. See, e.g., Bruegman v. Bruegman, 417 P.3d 157, 168–69, 170 n.3 (Wyo. 2018)
(citing benefits of conciliation). 
75. See, e.g., id. at 162–64, 168, 170 n.3.
76. For example, the statutes at issue in both Froland and Bos omitted any term
referring to the best interest of the children and simply defined interference with custody.  
See supra notes 30, 42 and accompanying text. 
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The author of the Texas court’s opinion was a former domestic relations 
judge.77  The opinion reflects this orientation: an orientation toward 
reconciliation. It begins with a detour into the ideal functions of grandparents, 
the alleged interferers in this case, and it makes excuses for them even 
before the evidence is recited: 
Grandparents have a special role in the family unit and often serve as safety nets
for their children and grandchildren.  Lending a hand, a heart, and an ear can be
especially important when loved ones are experiencing the trauma of divorce.
But being there in times of need sometimes ensnares grandparents in bitter divorce
disputes. In this tragic case, the grandparents’ adult daughter employed egregious
and outrageous tactics to prevent her ex-husband from seeing their two small
children . . . . [T]he grandparents supported their daughter emotionally and as a 
single mother, helping her care for their grandchildren.78 
With this beginning, the court signaled that the playing field would not 
be level. The effort would be to bring everyone together and avoid the
pending dispute.  The court would work to exonerate the parties who
supported the person who interfered.
Whatever the orientation of a court should be in a case involving the
best interest of the children, in a case involving interference with custody, 
the court’s focus should be adjudication, not reconciliation.  The existence 
of the claim makes reconciliation a long shot.  The resolution likely will
include curtailment or termination of an offending parent’s rights, as 
happened in both the New Jersey79 and the Texas80 cases. The law does
not call for balancing or consideration of welfare. 
The New Jersey court handled its case more appropriately.  Its tone 
throughout is dispassionate and ostensibly evenhanded.  Its consideration 
of, and rejection of, the crime of kidnapping is credibly based on the law.81 
There is no poetry. The tort or crime of interference with custody is a 
supremely harmful one, and a court should treat it so as to discourage it,
not excuse it.82 
B. Proof of Intent and Knowledge by Circumstantial Evidence 
“Because . . . intent is rarely overt, . . . [a plaintiff may] support a . . . claim 
with circumstantial evidence.”83  “Direct evidence of subjective awareness is 
77. Justice Eva Guzman, TEX. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.txcourts.gov/supreme/ 
about-the-court/justices/justice-eva-guzman.aspx [https://perma.cc/W6CR-PPMD].
78. Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 296 (footnote omitted). 
79. See supra Section II.A. 
80. See supra Section II.B.
 81. See State v. Froland, 936 A.2d 947, 950–56 (N.J. 2007) (analyzing kidnapping
conviction).
82. See id. at 953–54 (analyzing interference with custody). 
83.  Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 764 (Tex. 2018).
138
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not required; indeed, when a party’s state of mind is at issue, circumstantial 
evidence is often the only proof available.”84 Sometimes, there is direct 
evidence of intent or knowledge, particularly if the actor announces his or 
her state of mind or if someone else informs the actor convincingly of the 
likely result.85 
The Texas court was correct in recognizing that the tort of interference 
with custody requires “reasonable cause to believe” that a violation is
“likely.”86  But the court’s opinion does not give appropriate weight to the
circumstantial evidence that was necessary to prove this element.87  In at
least one instance detailed in the court’s opinion, there is direct evidence 
of the defendants’ knowledge of the order—the birthday party.88  But  
usually, evidence proving knowledge or intent is circumstantial. Here, 
there was ample circumstantial evidence, in addition to direct evidence, 
that showed knowledge.89  The court treats this evidence as though it applied 
only to Mother and only to schemes or planning.  Of course, mere planning 
does not create liability, as the opinion says;90 but the important point is
that the court misapprehended this evidence.  Far from merely showing a 
“scheme,” Mother engaged in “flagrant” conduct,91 as the opinion states, 
and it shows circumstantially that the defendants knew they were violating 
a court order. The case is similar to another case decided by the court and 
cited in its opinion, in which knowledge of a scoutmaster’s conduct was 
inferred from prior events.92 
First, Grandparents had been involved in an earlier course of similar 
conduct by their daughter.93 She had made the same kinds of allegations
against a boyfriend, and Grandparents actually paid a sum of money to 
84. City of San Antonio v. Tenorio, 543 S.W.3d 772, 782–83 (Tex. 2018) (footnotes 
omitted) (first citing Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 348 (Tex. 
2004), superseded by statute, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 101.101(c) (West 2019), as 
recognized in Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57 (Tex. 2019)); and then citing 
Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 596 (Tex. 2002)). 
85. See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589, 595 (Tenn. 1990).
86.  Bos v. Smith, 556 S.W.3d 293, 300 (Tex. 2018). 
87. See supra notes 45–69 and accompanying text (discussing evidence of Grandparents’
awareness). 
88. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
89.  See Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 300. 
90. Id. at 301. 
91. Id. at 300. 
92. See Golden Spread Council, Inc. #562 of the Boy Scouts of Am. v. Akins, 926
S.W.2d 287, 290–91 (Tex. 1996). 
93. Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 304.
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settle her liability for that.94  The court’s opinion does not give any weight
to this fact.95 Second, Grandfather admitted to lying about the Father’s abuse 
himself.96  Again, the court gave no weight to this evidence.97  Grandparents
lived with Mother for an extended period and communicated with her 
frequently outside of that period.98  Her psychological illnesses, even if
diagnosed later, inevitably would have produced conduct that signaled the 
falsity of Mother’s claims.99  In similar fashion, the court dismissed all 
other evidence of knowledge.100  Even in the criminal law, ostrich-like behavior
proves intent or knowledge.101  Deliberate action to create deniability is
prevalent even in intact families on the part of parents,102 and presumably,
it is prevalent with those who assist them.
In spite of this background, the Texas court explained Grandparents’
behavior by referring to how badly Mother behaved.103 “Mother’s conduct
was so outrageous and unprecedented that Grandparents could not have 
reasonably anticipated Mother would behave as she did.”104 One might
argue that the extent of outrageousness of observed conduct makes it more 
recognizable, not less so, but this kind of inference usually is left to the trier 
of fact.  One might also argue that earlier similar conduct—false allegations 
against her boyfriend, requiring payment to settle—would make the conduct 
not “unprecedented.” Furthermore, one might consider that the evidence 
cumulatively weighed more than its single parts; but the Texas court excused 
all indications of knowledge singly, rather than cumulatively. 
The New Jersey court, in contrast, recited all of the evidence together
and concluded that it was sufficient by looking at it in its totality.105  The
court could have emulated the Texas court’s approach by excusing each 
fact after reciting it.  The opinion then might sound like this: buying a boat 
is not evidence of interference with custody, taking children on a vacation 
to South Carolina is not evidence of knowledge that the children were 
being abducted, and withdrawing sums of money from two bank accounts 
does not prove knowledge of a nefarious purpose.  In summary, knowledge 
of interference with custody is and should be required before a person 
94. Id.
 95. See id. at 300–02. 
96. Id. at 307.
 97. Id. at 302. 
98.  Id. at 298, 302. 
99. Id. at 304. 
100. Id.
 101. See United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 918–20 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
102. Id. 
 103.  Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 303. 
104. Id.
 105. See State v. Froland, 936 A.2d 947, 948–50 (N.J. 2007). 
140
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assisting can be liable, but it should be provable by circumstantial evidence. 
And the evidence should be considered in its cumulative weight, not viewed
and excused in separate bits. 
C. Public Awareness of Interference with Custody
One puzzling aspect of the Texas court’s opinion is its insistence that 
normal people are unaware of interference with custody.106  The Texas
court seemed to believe that recognition of interference is a strange thing 
within the general public.107 This approach seems to lie behind the court’s
incredulity at Grandparents’ apparent awareness of their daughter’s actions.108 
In fact, the court makes fact findings in several places in its opinion, to 
the effect that no one in Grandparent’s situation would have anticipated
false allegations in this case.109 
The available data are strongly to the contrary.  The comprehensive 
book, True and False Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse: Assessment and 
Case Management, edited by Tara Ney, shows that beginning as early as 
1980, a great deal of “media attention has been directed at sexual abuse 
allegations arising in custody and access disputes.”110 Michael F. Elterman
and Marion F. Ehrenberg say that many reports about “falsely accused fathers 
in the popular press” have illustrated the problem.111  Another researcher
reports that there has been a “media explosion” in which reports of alleged 
false allegations have been publicized.112 
The New Jersey court correctly avoids skepticism based on an erroneous
impression of public ignorance and appropriately reviews the evidence.113 
106. See Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 301–02. 
107. See id.
 108. See id. at 303 (concluding that Mother’s conduct was “unforeseeable”). 
109. See id. at 301–03 (concluding Grandparents had no “reason to attribute a sinister 
motive”; they “would not have had reasonable cause to believe” any improper behavior 
existed; and Mother’s conduct “was so outrageous and unprecedented” that they “could 
not have reasonably anticipated [it]”). 
110. Marion F. Ehrenberg & Michael F. Elterman, Evaluating Allegations of Sexual
Abuse in the Context of Divorce, Child Custody, and Access Disputes, in TRUE AND FALSE 
ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: ASSESSMENT AND CASE MANAGEMENT 209, 212 
(Tara Ney ed., 1991). 
111. Michael F. Elterman & Marion F. Ehrenberg, Sexual Abuse Allegations in Child
Custody Disputes, 14 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 269, 270 (1991). 
112. Meredith Sherman Fahn, Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse in Custody Disputes:
Getting to the Truth of the Matter, 25 FAM. L.Q. 193, 199 (1991). 
113. See generally State v. Froland, 936 A.2d 947, 950–56 (N.J. 2007) (analyzing
evidence). 
 141
























The Texas court actually imports a false view of public knowledge to avoid 
deferring to the trier of fact.114  
D. Proof of Knowledge or “Reason to Believe” on the Part of a 
Person Assisting a Violation 
The Texas statute contains a requirement of awareness, as presumably
all such statutes would.  A person who assists a violation is not liable unless 
he or she “had actual notice of the existence and contents of the order” or
“had reasonable cause to believe that the child was the subject of an order 
and that the persons actions were likely to violate the order.”115  In other
words, actual knowledge is not required.  A violation exists if the person 
assisting had “reason[] . . . to believe” that violation was “likely.”116 
The Texas court was so hostile to the finding of a violation that it
deliberately misread the statute.  In fact, the court’s opinion means that no 
one can be the subject of a successful interference claim unless they know
the specifics of particular dates and times in a court order that they have 
assisted in violating.117  The opinion states, “Under the standard possession
order, Father was entitled to possession in specified circumstances. Thus, 
Father had to prove he was denied possession during those specific times 
and that Grandparents aided those particular violations.”118 
This requirement appears nowhere in the Texas statute,119 and in fact it 
is contrary to the explicit words of the statute.  Furthermore, it is a nonsequitur.  
The requirement that Father was denied proper access does not imply that 
someone assisting in a violation needs to know the exact terms of a 
possession order to be assisting in the violation.
In fact, the term that the court’s opinion adds to the statute would lead
to results that the legislature could not possibly have intended.  For example,
if a person were to assist a violation by secreting the child for months, or 
for a year, or for a time long enough so that anyone must have known that
it violated an access order, the assister could not be proved liable because
the assister would not have known the exact dates and hours of access
under the order.  Alternatively, if someone were to assist in removing the 
child from the state or even taking the child to a foreign country, the assister 
could not be proved liable, because the Texas court’s opinion requires
knowledge of the exact times in the court’s order.120  These results are not 
114. See generally Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 301–02. 
115.  TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 42.003 (West 2019). 
116. Id.; see Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 300. 
117. Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 301. 
118. Id.
 119. See generally FAM. § 42.003. 
120.  See Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 301. 
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required by the Texas statute either expressly or impliedly, and the words
of the statute are explicitly to the contrary.  One can only conclude that
these words of the opinion are hyperbole, not to be taken literally. 
At one point, the court states that Grandparents “never received a copy 
of the standard possession order” and they “did not know the details.”121 
This observation should not have been a reason for holding against Father. 
But given the court’s reasoning, it might be prudent, if it were not so
outlandish, for a noncustodial parent to send a copy of the governing decree 
to every person who might assist in interference, by certified mail.122 
Actually, there was at least one instance when the defendants obviously
had notice of the time when they were violating the court’s order: the 
birthday party.  On the date in question:
Father called Grandmother and told her he had the right to possess Mike under
the standard possession order for the upcoming weekend and would be collecting
him from Mother’s house at 6:00 p.m. on Friday evening. . . . [B]ut the boys were
not home because, at Mother’s request, Grandmother had taken them to a two-
hour birthday party.123 
The court points out that Father did not contact Grandmother.124  But it
does not matter what Mother or Father did, or that it was “just” a birthday 
party.  The important fact is that Grandmother had “reason[] . . . to believe” 
that the violation she was committing was “likely.”125  Even under the court’s
added requirement of precise knowledge, which is not within the statute, 
the violation is indisputable.  Furthermore, it does not matter that parents 
often trade times; the parties had no agreement here.126 The court’s holding 
that this indisputable violation was not a violation may cause more instances 
of contempt of court orders. 
The New Jersey court did not make this mistake.  Its holding is based
on evidence that meant that Froland had sound reason to believe that there 
was a violation.127  There is and should be a requirement of knowledge,
121. Id.
122. Obviously, this advice is unrealistic unless the potential assisters pose a serious
risk. 
123.  Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 297. 
124. Id.
 125. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 42.003(b)(1) (West 2019). 
126.  See Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 297. 
 127. See generally State v. Froland, 936 A.2d 947, 950–56 (N.J. 2007) (analyzing
evidence). 
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but it should not be a requirement that the violator have the precise terms 
of the governing court order in memory. 
E. Every Party Is Presumed to Know the Law 
The standard possession order in Texas is “standard” because it is a part 
of the law. By violating the standard possession order, Grandparents 
automatically violated the law with knowledge, because of the principle 
that every citizen is presumed to know the law. The standard possession 
order is set out in its entirety at section 153.312 of the Texas Family
Code.128  The statute contains specific and exact times for possession, 
which are imputed as knowledge: 
(1) on weekends throughout the year beginning at 6 p.m. on the first, third, and 
fifth Friday of each month and ending at 6 p.m. on the following Sunday; and 
(2) on Thursdays of each week during the regular school term beginning at 6
p.m. and ending at 8 p.m., unless the court finds that visitation under this
subdivision is not in the best interest of the child.129 
Further provisions—very specific provisions—govern possessions for
vacations, certain holidays, and other situations with specific possession 
lengths and dates.130  If having read the precise law at issue was a 
requirement, the law could not work.  In any event, an assister is presumed 
to have known the standard possession order established by law, just as 
they are presumed to know more detailed provisions like the provision of 
the penal code that defines murder,131 or specific vehicular violations 
defined by a transportation code.132  In fact, a complete stranger to the
family code would have had ample notice of the access schedule in this 
case, if only from the frequency of Grandparents’ interventions, which 
included “monitoring” Mother by living on site with her. 
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING INTERFERENCE CLAIMS VIABLE
Researchers of false accusations of child abuse are vehement in saying 
that the accusations cause lasting harm not only to noncustodial parents
but also to children.  As Elterman and Ehrenberg report, “If an error is 
made, a child’s physical and psychological security may be jeopardized
128. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.312 (West 2019). 
129. Id. at § 153.312(a); see also Cole v. Camelback Mountain Ski Resort, No. 3:16-
CV-1959, 2017 WL 2805499, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2017) (collecting Supreme Court, 
federal, and state authorities establishing this proposition). 
130. See generally FAM. § 153.312. 
131. E.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (West 2019). 
132. E.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 522.011 (West 2019). 
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or a parent’s family life and career may be destroyed.”133  And “[c]ase
studies of falsely accused fathers in the popular press” have shown that 
“attempting to prove one’s innocence can be emotionally and financially 
devastating.”134 
The use of false allegations in custody disputes is more widespread than
in other contexts.  “The proportion of [probably false] allegations of sexual 
abuse made by parents during . . . custody and visitation [litigation] has been
significantly greater” than those made in other circumstances.135  Other 
researchers “were unable to document 10 of 18 (55%) charges of sexual 
abuse in children evaluated during custody and visitation disputes.”136  Another
researcher “reported four improbable and seven probable allegations of 
sexual abuse made by the custodial, against the noncustodial, parent (36%).”137 
These are high proportions of false allegations.  Twenty-two percent of false, 
or improbable, allegations were made by children—meaning nearly 80%
by parents or others; one-third of these were produced by custodial disputes.138 
And the incentive to commit violations is powerful, because violations
are successful.  Elterman and Ehrenberg say, “Allegations of sexual abuse
have been most common in child custody disputes . . . and center around
issues of visitation.”139  Furthermore, “An allegation of sexual abuse . . . will
capture the judge’s attention and effect an immediate suspension of the 
noncustodial parent’s visitation rights.”140 
The legislatures of both New Jersey and Texas wanted to stop this malignant 
practice with their interference with custody statutes. 
V. CONCLUSION
The decisions of the New Jersey and Texas courts are bookends.  They
illustrate both appropriate and unduly cramped readings of interference
with custody laws.  Liability under the law should not follow upon every
mistaken interference with another parent’s custody, because parties should 
be able to engage in informal trades of visitation times, and even cooperation 
133.  Elterman & Ehrenberg, supra note 111, at 270. 
134. Id.
 135. Id. at 272.  Researchers tend to use the terms “probable” and “improbable” in
describing apparently true and false claims because there is no clear dichotomy. 
136. Id.
 137. Id.
138. Ehrenberg & Elterman, supra note 110, at 213–14. 
139.  Elterman & Ehrenberg, supra note 111, at 273. 
140.  Id. 
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produces occasional disputes. But proof of serious violations should not 
be made unduly difficult. The New Jersey Supreme Court used proper methods 
of considering the evidence and interpreted the law sensibly.  The Texas 
Supreme Court was so hostile to the interference tort that it misread both 
the evidence and the governing statute.
Evidence in such a case should be viewed in its totality.  One way for a 
court to sabotage an interference law is to view each piece of evidence in
isolation and to explain each piece away separately.  The Texas court used 
this method to reach an unfortunate result, while the New Jersey court
properly considered the totality of the evidence.  Proof of knowledge, awareness, 
or “reason to believe” elements of the tort will normally be supplied from 
circumstantial evidence, because it is impossible to open an offender’s 
head to find direct proof.  The New Jersey court considered circumstantial
evidence of knowledge appropriately, but the Texas court did not.  Furthermore, 
the Texas court treated false allegations of abuse as so unfamiliar that people
could not possibly be expected to know about their existence, whereas the 
literature shows that the public is well aware of this phenomenon.
Interpretation of the element of awareness by one assisting a violation
is a particularly important issue. The Texas court’s requirement that a 
violator know the precise terms of the governing court order is not only
unrealistic but contrary to the express terms of the statute, which requires
only “reason[] . . . to believe” that a violation is “likely.”141  The New Jersey
court avoided this mistake.  The Texas court compounded its error by failing 
to realize that the possession order in the case before it was part of the 
statewide law, expressed verbatim in a statute, of which knowledge was 
imputed to the violators. 
Interference with custody is a malignant tort.  The literature documents 
the harm done both to children and to parents.  The claim for interference
with custody should be neither so easy to prove that it makes cooperation 
between parents difficult nor so hard to prove that it ceases to be a viable
claim. New Jersey has reached the right balance of these goals, but Texas
has not.
141. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 42.003(b)(2) (West 2019). 
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